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RULES OF EVIDENCE IN PRELIMINARY
CONTROVERSIES AS TO ADMISSIBILITY
JOHN MlACARTHUR MAGUIRE AND CHARLES S. S. EPSTEIN
I
"In preliminary ;'ulings by a judge on the admissibility of
evidence, the ordinary rules of evidence do not apply . . .
Thus Professor Wigmore compactly states the proposition which
we propose to examine. The English writer Best says, with
respect to preliminary inquiries made and decided by the judge,
"it seems the better opinion that, for the purpose of determin-
ing such collateral questions, the judge is not restricted to legal
evidence". 2 Phipson's admirable treatise on evidence also ad-
vances the view that "the better opinion is that the judge is
not confined to strictly legal evidence, but may rely, e.g. on
affidavits . . ." 3 But Taylor, speaking of the possibility of
using affidavits in such preliminary matters, says: "This course,
however, though highly convenient, is of questionable legality,
and the doubt on the subject has not been cleared up by the
Rules".-
None of the quotations above should be taken to mean that
eveiy rule of evidence goes by the board in these preliminary
judicial inquiries. The mere shift from ultimate to introductory
questions and from jury to judge furnishes no cause for dis-
carding such doctrines as the marital privileges and incom-
petencies, the privilege against self-incrimination, the privilege
protecting state secrets, or the lawyer-client privilege. All these
doctrines are supposed to guard interests which would suffer as
greatly from forced public revelations to a judge as from like
revelations to a jury.5 But this shift does furnish good cause
13 WIGMTORE, EvWDn.Cu (2d ed. 1923) § 1385; see also 1 ibid. §§ 4,
12, 487, 497, 587; 2 ibid. § 861; 3 ibid. §§ 1808, 1820; and 5 ibid. §§ 2322,
2550. Both the quotation above and our text itself acsume the con-
ventional rule that preliminary questions of fact relating to the admissi-
bility of evidence are to be decided by the judge rather than by the jury.
This rule we have discussed in a companion article on Preizina;ry Q fc Wf in
of Fact in Determining the Admissibility of EideAncc (1927) 40 I, nv. L.
REv. 392.
2 BE ST, EviDENcE (12th ed. 1922) 70.
3 PHisoN, EVIDENCE (6th ed. 1921) 12.
4 1 TAiLOR, EVIDENCE (11th ed. 1920) 375--376.
5 For an analysis of the history and policy of theze privileg s and
in competencies see 4 WIGMTORE, op. cit. sv'pra note 1, §§ 2227, 2228 (marital
privilege); 5 ibid. §§ 2332, 2333 (privileged communications between hu;-
band and wife) ; 1 ibid. §§ 600, 601 (marital incompetency) ; 4 ibid. §§ 220,
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for taking unconventional short cuts through the hearsay rule
and other doctrines intended wholly or principally to guard
against erroneous findings of fact in the very trial0 Since pre-
liminary matters should be dealt with expeditiously, as to them
a court may well run some risk of inaccuracy to gain speed.
And the risk is very slight, for a judge's experienced shrewdness
enables him to discount evidence which gullible jurymen might
greatly overvalue.7 It is in this latter field of evidential restric-
tions that we must search for material to test the more or less
positive statements of Wigmore, Best, Phipson, and Taylor:
A further introductory warning is necessary. In a multitude
of proceedings leading up to, following, or somehow supple-
menting actual trials on the merits, evidence inadmissible at such
trials is employed to establish material facts. It is a common-
place to support motions with affidavits, suggestions, or even
bare assertions of counsel. Such summary, often informal, pro-
2251 (privilege against self-incrimination); 5 ibid. § 2378 (privilege re-
specting state secrets) ; and 5 ibid. §§ 2290, 2291 (lawyer-client privilege).
The present authors are no more favorably impressed than is Professor
Wignore by many of the reasons given for these restrictive rules. But Eo
far as we continue the rules we ought' to live up to their spirit. It must be
admitted that in the early days before the doctrines of evidence had been
lucidly explained there were decisions departing from the principle sug-
gested by the text. See, for example, Rex v. Wright, 1 Sessions Cas. 243
(K. B. 1734), where on a motion for an information an affidavit by the
prosecutor's wife was allowed to be read for the defendant; the court
"leaving the Point undetermined whether she could be a Witness upon the
Trial". But by way of contrast we have the almost contemporaneous
case of Walker v. Kerney, 7 Mod. 413 (K. B. 1741), where the court declined
to accept defendant's affidavit in a preliminary matter after it was shown
that defendant had been convicted of forgery and had stood in the pillory.
Disqualification visited upon a would-be witness because of infamy involved
a punitive element, added to the notion that as an infamous person he was
unworthy of belief.
6As suggested in the text, the hearsay rule is on analytical grounds
the best example of this class of evidential doctrines. It has indeed been
said that the sole or principal reason for the hearsay rule is a distrust
of jurymen's good judgment. Berkeley Peerage Case, 4 Camp. N. P. 401,
415 (H. L. 1811), per Mansfield, C. J.; cf. Wright v. Doe d. Tatham, 5 Cl.
& Fin. 670, 692, 701, 719, 726,748, 769 (H. L. 1838). See also infra note 54.
The case of Rex v. Bell, Andrews, 64 (K. B. 1737), has some bearing. There
a motion was made for bail upon the affidavits of the applicants themselves.
The court overruled an objection that this was allowing the parties to
purge themselves of felony, saying "that they (the court) might make use
of any means for receiving light in the case, in order to guide their dis-
cretion; And to be sure the court will not place an undue credit on the
affidavits of the parties themselves". But the historical basis for the
hearsay rule is somewhat different from that suggested by Chief Justice
Mansfield in the passage referred to above. THAYER, PRELIMINARY TR=ATISt
ON EVIDENCE (1898) 498-501, 518 et seq.; 3 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note
1, §§ 1364 et circa.
7 See first three references in note 6.
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bative methods have been long accepted and are illustrated as
frequently in seventeenth and eighteenth century English cases
as in modern practice. With these matters we are not concerned.
Our interest centres upon proof df those facts which must be
established as immediate conditions precedent to admission or
exclusion of evidence offered during trials.
H
The earlier English decisions give our historical background.
Consequently we begin by sketching them and for convenience
trace their development in England before crossing the Atlantic
to consider the American authorities. Bredon (or B'ccdoin) v.
Gill," a carefully considered litigation arising in 1697, strikes a
good keynote although its actual result has no bearing upon our
problem. Bredon sought a prohibition 0 from King's Bench, sug-
gesting the following facts: Gill had exhibited an information
against him before the commissioners of excise. These commis-
sioners adjudged Bredon guilty. He appealed to the commis-
sioners for appeals under a statutory provision requiring them
"to summon the party accused, and upon his appearance or
contempt to proceed to the examination of the matter of Fact
and upon proofe made thereof either by the voluntary confession
of the party, or by the oath of one or more credible Witnesses
(which oath they or any two or more of them have hereby power
to administer) to give Judgment or Sentence." "I Gill offered
in evidence before the commissioners for appeals the minutes
of testimony taken before the commissioners of excise, although
$ The case is reported with variations of detail in Comb. 414, 1 Ld.
Raymond, 219, 3 ibi. 179, 5 Mod. 269, 2 Salk. 555. We take this oc-
casion to speak frankly of both the quality and quantity of our English
material. Few of the seventeenth and eighteenth century reporters are re-
garded as highly reliable. However, we must use what there is at hand.
The number of relevant reported cases is dishearteningly small. Even
examination of more than fifty reporters, volume by volume, and almost
page by page, has disclosed only a few early decisions. We suspcct that
the nature of the problem was not very clear to contemporary lawycrs
or judges and that possible manifestations of it were often glossed over.
9 Incidentally this case affords an excellent illustration of the distinction
drawn by the last paragraph in section I of our text. A motion for a
prohibition might be supported by affidavit as distinguished from virn race
evidence. This was absolutely beyond question. The principal point of
doubt was in discriminating between those motions for this type of relief
which necessitated no evidential showing at all and those in connection Vith
which affidavits were required. Godfrey v. Lewellin, Rep. t. Holt, 593, 2
Salk. 549 (K. B. 1700); Savill v. Kirby, 10 Mod. 385 (K. B. 1717); Anon.,
2 Barn. 285 (K. B. 1733); Surby v. York, Andrews, 7 (K. B. 1737);
Dawson v. Wilkinson, ibid. 11; Buggin v. Bennett, 4 Burr. 2035 (K. B. 1765).
10 12 Car. II, c. 23 (1660), 5 St. Realm, 257. The report of the case in
Mod. purports to quote the act. But as a matter of fact the reporter
gives no more than a substantially accurate paraphrase.
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the witnesses were still alive and available, and the commis-
sioners for appeals ruled this evidence admissible. Bredon
claimed that the ruling was unlawful. The opinion in Ring's
Bench contains a significanft remark: "Curia. The common
law does not require, that witnesses shall be examined viva voce,
except where the trial is by jury." "I Another reporter puts it:
"Holt Ch.J. How doth the Common Law require, where the Trials
are not by Jury, that the Depositions should not be taken in
Writing." 12 A third version: ". . . and the law does not
make viva voce evidence necessary, unless before a jury." 11
Now this might mean any of several things. At its mildest,
that appeals should be heard on the record compiled below. But
the quoted act upon its face shows this appellate proceeding not
to be of that restricted type. And indeed the ultimate decision
was that the 'prohibition should issue because of Parliament's
manifest intent to provide a hearing de novo before the commis-
sioners for appeals, with fresh examination of witnesses. 14  Or
the remark might imply that in proceedings before a tribunal
not including a jury, the personal attendance of witnesses may
be dispensed with. Or, taken still more strongly, the remark
might have led to decisions that in proceedings of this type the
whole hearsay rule, and by reasonable extension other associated
rules, may be broken down as thoroughly as the tribunal desires.
Either of the last two implications would of course justify a
corresponding relaxation of evidential rules in preliminary hear-
ings before a judge on questions of admissibility.
The strongest implication certainly was not fully accepted.
Within about fifty years we find Lord Hardwicke stating fre-
21 5 Mod. at 277. We find the converse many years later in a case
holding that an agreement to try by affidavits implies an agreement to
try without a jury. Brooke v. Wigg, 8 Ch. D. 510 (1878).
12 Comb. at 415.
13 2 Salk. 555. The report of the case in Ld. Raymond contains no cor-
responding passage.
14 5 Mod, at 278, 2 Salk. ubi supra, and 1 Ld. Raymond, at 222. Comber-
bach does not show the final disposition of the case, his report stopping
at the half-way mark. In this connection see Apthorp v. Eyres, Quincy
(Mass.), 229, 231 (1766), where the Colonial Chief Justice says: "Cer-
tainly Courts are not tied up to such strict Rule in Admission of Evi-
dence, as when it is to go to Juries". During the proceedings in Parlia-
ment with respect to the attainder of Sir John Fenwick, 13 How. St. Tr.
537, 585 (1696), Sir John Hawles, Solicitor General, made an argument
which at first reading suggests the language quoted in the text above. As
a matter of fact, however, the speaker was simply trying to persuade the
House that it might hear objectionable evidence before deciding finally
whether to admit or reject it. Reg. v. Ryle, 9 M. & W. 227, 239, 244 (Ex.
1841), contains language which is of some interest in this connection, but
the immediate case under consideration was of a different type. See infra
note 47. Cf. Higgins v. Watson, infra note 86, and Bagley v. Eaton, infra
note 73.
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quently that rules of evidence are the same in equity as at law
and drawing no distinction whatever because of the absence
of a jury from one court and its presence in the other.1 This
may be well enough as to privileges of witnesses. But the great
Chancellor was not ruling on claims of privilege. He was passing
upon questions of hearsay,"" incompetency for interest, 17 and ad-
missibility of secondary evidence of the authenticity or contents
of documents.,' As to some at least of these questions one may
well feel that the routine adoption of legal rules was a mistake.
The nail has been driven and clinched, however, and the influence
of Hardwicke's attitude endures to this day. Some American
cases referred to hereafter hint at a departure from the English
rule. But the hint breaks down when really put to the test.
Despite these decisions as to the rules of evidence respecting
ultimate controversies of fact in Chancery, we find on prelimin-
ary questions of admissibility in that court a practice which
accords to some extent with the stronger interpretations of the
remark quoted from Bredon v. Gill. A succession of cases run-
ning from about 1722 through 1754 involved situations requir-
ing parties to prove certain preliminary facts-usually death
or inaccessibility of witnesses-to justify the use of depositions.
All these cases as a matter of course permit the preliminary
proof to be by affidavit.19 Indeed under proper facts the Chan-
15 Henley v. Philips, 2 Atk. 48 (Ch. 1740); Glynn v. Bank of England,
2 Ves. Sr. 38, 41 (Oh. 1750); and Askew v. The Poulterers Company, 2
Ves. Sr. 89, 91 (Ch. 1750). See also Scott v. Fenwick, 3 Gwillim Tithe
Cases, 1250, 1255 (1783), a case on the equity side of the Exchequer.
Compare Lefebure v. Worden, 2 Ves. Sr. 54 (Ch. 1750); Brown v. Yerro-
way, Dick. 353 (Ch. 1762) ; Cotton v. Luttrell, 1 Atk. 451, 452 (Ch. 1738) ;
Man v. Ward, 2 ibid. 223 (Ch. 1741); Mabank v. Metcalf, 3 ibid. 95 (Ch.
1744); Barret v. Gore, 3 ibid. 401 (Ch. 1746); Fotherby v. Pate, 3 ibid.
603 (Ch. 1747); Dixon v. Parker, 2 Ves. Sr. 219, 222 et seq. (Ch. 1750);
Armiter v. Swanton, 1 Ambler (ed. 1828), 393 (Ch. 1701); and our article
referred to in note 1 supra, at 414, n. 73.
16 Glynn v. Bank of England, supra note 15.
17 Manning v. Lechmere, 1 Atk. 453 (Ch. 1737).
is Henley v. Philips, supra note 15; Askew . The Poulterers Company,
supra note 15; and Clavering v. Clavering, 2 Yes. Sr. 232 (Ch. 1751). The
adoption by equity of these principles respecting documentary evidence is
defensible. Any court may wisely enforce such preferential rulez.
3 9Debrox v. (Ch. 1722), included in the report of Copeland
v. Stanton, 1 P. Wms. 414, 415 (Ch. 1718); Cox v. George, Select Cas.
t. King, 11 (Ch. 1725); Ward v. Sykes, Ridgeway Cas. t. Hardwicke, 193
(Ch. 1744); Smales v. Chayter, Dick. 99 (Ch. 1745); Gason v. Wordsworth,
2 Yes. Sr. 325, 336, 337, Ambler, 108 (Ch. 1751); and Anon., 2 Ves. Sr.
497, Ambler, 237 (Ch. 1754). Later cases indicate the continuance of
this same practice. Morrison v. Arnold, 19 Ves. Jr. 670, 672 (Ch. 1817);
and Bidduiph v. Lord Camoys, 19 Beavan, 467 (Ch. 1854), at a later stage
20 ibid. 402 (Ch. 1855). See also the indication of ecclesiastical practice
in Weguelin v. Weguelin, 2 Curteis, 263 (1839).
1106 YALE LAW JOURNAL
cellors several times directed that depositions be admitted as
evidence in trials at law, accepting affidavits to prove the ex-
istence of these proper facts.20  Such equity decisions, of course,
furnish no reliable basis for determining how a common law
judge was likely to decide parallel problems. Affidavits would
seem normal to a Chancellor who almost invariably took his
proofs by deposition.21 Instead of elaborating this theme, there-
fore, we move over at once to the law courts.
Here we find more than one line of cases developing. Most
of the lines can be briefly dismissed. First, suppose a witness is
claimed to be incompetent by reason of interest. May the chal-
lenged witness himself testify on voir dire? The answer is gen-
erally affirmative.22 But this witness is not proved incompetent.
His competency is only in doubt and since the burden of pre-
liminary proof is on the objecting party 23 we may more reason-
ably listen to the witness than refuse to hear him. Besides, it
is arguable that even if interest fatally infects a witness's cre-
dibility as to the merits, it need not infect his credibility as to
the existence of the interest itself. While this rings hollow to
the ear of common sense, such hairsplitting distinctions are no
strangers to the law of evidence. The distinction becomes im-
possible, though, when the same problem as to voir dire exam-
ination arises with respect to a witness challenged as incapable
of taking the oath.2 4 Yet here too the English courts employed
his preliminary testimony. Perhaps this was because the most
obvious alternative means for proving lack of belief in divine
20 The best case of a considerable number is Corbett v. Corbett, 1 V. & B.
335 (Ch. 1813) ; some other cases are referred to by the note in Ambler,
108. By way of analogy Laragoity v. Attorney General, 2 Price, 172,
176, 180, 185 (1816), is worth citing; it arose on the equity side of the
Exchequer. See also s.c. 3 ibid. 221 (1816).
2'1 Graves v. Budgel, 1 Atk. 444, 445 (Ch. 1737), and Bank v. Farques,
Ambler, 145, Dick. 167 (Ch. 1752), indicate the extremely restricted scope
given viva voce evidence in the contemporary Chancery practice.
22 Sometimes the answer is given by implication only. Fotheringham v.
Greenwood, 1 Str. 129 (K. B. 1718); Rex v. Bray, Cas. t. Hardwicke, 358,
359 (K. B. 1736); Lord Lovat's Case, 18 How. St. Tr. 529, 579-586,
596-597 (H. L. 1746); Downing v. Townsend, Ambler 592, 593 (Ch. 1753);
and Bent v. Baker, 3 T. R. 27, 32 (K. B. 1789). See also the related
cases in (1927). 40 HAnv. L. REV. at 409, n. 58, and 416, n. 76.
23 This seems to be the general rule as to burden of proof in connection
with the existence of incompetencies and privileges. See (1927) 40 HARV.
L. Rv. at 409, n. 58, and 427, n. 99.
24 1n order to be examined on the voir dire the witness was required to
take the following oath: "You shall true answer make to all such questions
as shall be demanded of you; and you shall speak the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth. So help you God". Lord Lovat's Case,
supra note 22, at 583. See Rex v. White, 1 Leach (4th ed. 1815) 430 (Old
Bailey, 1786), and Maden v. Catanach, 7 H. & N. 360, 364-366 (Ex. 1861);
also 3 WIGMO E, op. cit. supra note 1, § 1820.
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rewards and punishments consisted of the witness's extrajudicial
declarations about his religious principles.25 The courts had
early accepted utterances as evidence of the speaker's existing be-
liefs. , But it would have been ludicrous to prefer bare hear-
say on this point to a statement in court by the same man when
subject to questioning by the judge and probably to cross-ex-
amination by objecting counsel.2 7
The reader will observe that the last sentences of the preced-
ing paragraph, while still touching the point of proving facts
to establish competency or incompetency, have moved us into
the question of employing hearsay for that purpose. On this
question we encounter a tantalizing case in 1732.* Plaintiff's
object was to prove a marriage. He offered one Mrs. Mottram,
said to have been an eye witness of the ceremony. Whereupon
opposing counsel objected to her being sworn, since he could
produce "one Mrs. Davis, who would swear, that she heard Mrs.
Mottram say, that in case the Marriage could be proved the
Plaintiff's Mother would take care that she should never want
during her Life." 29 A lively discussion arises, in which the court
are as active as counsel. Cases are cited and described to in-
dicate a difference of opinion between King's Bench and Ex-
chequer on one side, and the House of Lords on the other. Fi-
nally Lord Raymond swings his colleagues into line by arguing
"that it might be a Thing of dangerous Consequence upon such
an Exception totally to exclude a Person from being an Evidence.
He said an honest Witness might have a Well-vishing to one
25 Smith v. Coffin, 18 Mle. 157, 159-162 (1841).
26 Hathaway's Case, 14 How. St. Tr. 639, 653, 654 (Surrey Assizes,
1702). The principle of this case may explain the usage in conn etion
with dying declarations. At least one fairly early case seems to admit such
a declaration without any showing or indication that the dcclarant Imew
he was dying. In fact the indications were that he had some expectation
of recovery. Earl of Pembroke's Case, 6 How. St. Tr. 1309, 1325 (H. L.
1678). Less than fifty years later the auditor of a dying declaration pre-
faced his testimony thereto with the statement that the declarant spoke
of himself as a dying man. Rex v. Reason and Tranter, 1 Str. 499, 10
How. St. Tr. 1, 24-38 (K. B. 1722). Within the next seventy years it ap-
parently became a commonplace to use the declarant's statement3 as evi-
dence of his realization of impending death. Woodcock's Case, 1 Leach (4th
ed. 1815) 500 (Old Bailey, 1789).
27 But as an analogy consider the old doctrine that the affidavit of a
party might be accepted to establish the loss of an original writing, the
contents of which he proposed to prove by secondary evidence. This is
discussed at p. 1120, infra. The extent to which such affidavits were em-
ployed in England seems quite doubtful. See the reference given in 1
GRE iLEAF, EVIENCE (16th ed. 1899) § 349, n. 3, in App. II at SO7, and
2 TAYLOR, EVWDENCE (1st ed. 1848) 882, n. (t).
2s Lomax v. Honeby, 2 Barn. 178 (K. B. 1732). Compare Commonwealth
v. 'aite, infra note 88.
29 Ibid. at 178.
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side of a Cause, and in the Zeal of his Heart might say, it would
be better for him, if the Cause went on the Side he wished it
would. Yet perhaps, if this Person was to be examined upon his
Oath, it would be found, that he would not be one Six-pence
the better for the Event of it." 30 That is, the judges do not
necessarily hold the hearsay inadmissible, but do deny its ade-
quacy. They fear misquotation or misinterpretation. However,
as a preliminary, Mrs. Davis is called; "but when she came to
be examined, she said nothing that was material." 31 Here surely
is the great grandfather of our modern story in which the lawyer
asks his witness: "What did Jones say next?"; a great wrangle
ensues, assertions are made, authorities quoted; and, at length,
when the question is allowed, the witness answers: "I couldn't
hear what he said."
Finally we come to a long and interesting line of decisions
analogous to the chancery cases already spoken of with respect
to the admissibility of depositions. In 1613 32 and again in 1664 11
the law courts indicate that the death or absence of deponents
may be proved by affidavit. But in 1624 there is talk of prov-
ing a witness's inaccessibility by "oath"; 31 and in 1666, when
preparing for the trial of Lord Morley, the judges unanimously
resolve that if certain witnesses are "dead or unable to Travel;
and Oath made thereof . . . the examinations of such Wit-
nesses [before the coroner] . . . might be read, the Cor-
oner first making Oath" that the examinations are the unaltered
originals.35 This is ambiguous. Does "Oath" connote viva voce
30 Ibid. at 179.
31 Ibid. at 179. One previous case referred to by the court appears to be
Whithall v. Sir George Saunders, W. Kelynge, 62 (K. B. 1732). As here
reported it does not suggest the subtle point discussed by the text. But
this may be the fault of the reporter. The solution of the principal case
might depend partly upon whether the actual existence of interest or the
witness's belief in its existence was the disqualifying factor. At least one
nearly contemporaneous opinion says that "if a witness thinks himself
interested in the question, though in strictness of law he is not, yet he
ought not to be sworn". Fotheringham v. Greenwood, supra note 22, at
129. A scrutiny of the facts in this controversy indicates that no such
broad principle need be enunciated to sustain the result. With the principal
case compare Needham v. Smith, 2 Vern. 463 (Ch. 1704), where the wit-
ness's declaration of his interest had been made in an answer to a bill
exhibited against him.
32 Sir Francis Fortescue and Coake's Case, Godb. 193 (C. P. 1613).
Commentators have cited this case as involving the affidavit of a party.
There is nothing in the bare text of the report to necessitate such inter-
pretation.
33 Sir Martyn Nowels Case, 1 Keb. 685 (K. B. 1664).
34 Anon., Godb. 326-327 (K. B. 1624). Here the court unmistakably
contemplated accepting the oath of a party.
35 J. Kelyng, 53, 55 (1666). The text above refers to only one of three
resolutions material to our topic. These resolutions are reprinted in Lord
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testimony as it did in Bredon v. Gill? Six years after Lord Mor-
ley's Case, "it being sworn by the Exetcr waggoner" that a wit-
ness "fell so sick that he was unable to travel any farther, [the
witness's] depositions in chancery . . . were admitted to
be read." 3 This sounds like viva voce examination on the pre-
liminary point. And in 1729 "IAIr. Reeves then produc'd another
Witness, who swore that the first was in Scotland. And upon
that the Court allowd the [first witness's) Deposition to be
read." 37 Two subsequent cases antedating 1750 emphasize the
necessity of satisfying a common law judge that the maker of
a proffered deposition is dead, sick, beyond seas, or not amenable
to process and do not negative the idea that this preliminary
proof must be viva. voce.38
Having thus indicated the tendency of decision, we skip for-
ward to the early nineteenth century and find further opinions
continuing the same tone3 Soon the judges' attitude becomes
more positive. In 1836 Lord Abinger at qdsi prius calls for
proof that deponents are abroad. Counsel diffidently suggests
that the depositions themselves say deponents are going abroad.
The answer comes: "That is not sufficient; you must have other
proof that they are abroad." -o In 1841 the same judge refuses
to admit a deposition on testimony that "a person, whom [wit-
ness] believed to be the deponent's wife" had told witness de-
ponent was abroad; for "it was indispensible to prove, by proper
evidence, that the [deponent] was out of England. Here, there
Morley's Case, 6 How. St. Tr. 769, 770-771 (H. L. 1000). At the trial
depositions were admitted "upon proof made that the witnesses were dead,
and oath by the coroner, that the depositions were unaltered . . 2' Ibid.
776. Also: "Thonwms Hardhzg sworn, deposed" as to the unavailability of a
witness whose deposition was offered and rejected. Ibid. 777. In Har-
rison's Case, 12 ib& 833, 852, the same point arose. A deposition was ad-
mitted after "being proved by the Coroner". The context indicates that
the coroner was personally present at the trial. Compare the cases aris-
ing under an act permitting the use of depositions in criminal prosecutions
after certain proof "by the oath or affirmation of any credible vtness".
Reg. v. Riley, 3 Car. & K. 116 (1851), and Re.x v. Noakes, [1917] 1 K. B.
581. See also the discussion in Reg. v. Ryle, supra note 14, at 227, 229-230,
245.
2 Lutterell v. Reynell, 1 Mod. 282, 283-284 (K. B. 1072). This is a
leading case.
37 Patterson v. St. Clair, 1 Barn. 268 (K. B. 1729).
38 Fry v. Wood, 1 Atk. 445 (Ch. 1737) ; Ward v. Sykes, szpra note 19.
39 Fonsick v. Agar, 6 Esp. 92 (C. P. 1806) ; Falconer v. Hanson, 1 Camp.
N. P. 171, 172 (N. P. 1808); Andrews v. Palmer, 1 V. & B. 21, 22-23 (Ch.
1812), which discloses a practice appearing later with modification; At-
torney General v. Ray, 2 Hare, 518 (Ch. 1843); and Pond v. Dimes, 3
Moore & S. 161 (C. P. 1833).
40 Proctor v. Lainson, 7 Car. & P. 629, 631 (N. P. 1836). Compare infta
note 103, where somewhat similar American cases are citcd.
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was nothing but hearsay to rely upon." 41 Yet now, as we draw
near the end of this historical review, we do scent the powder
smoke and hear the noise of rebellion. Chief Baron Pollock
fired the first shot at nisi prius in 1848 when he admitted a de-
position on the strength of an affidavit as to the deponent's un-
availability. This was an obscure shot, to be sure, referred to
in print only by Taylor's text and one of his footnotes and there
not approved.42 It became, however, of considerable importance
eighteen years later in Duke of Beaufort v. Crawshay.4  De-
fendant here desired to use a deposition. He called a witness
who testified strongly to the deponent's old age, incapacity, and
illness. The plaintiff objected to the adequacy of such evidence
because the witness was a mere layman, not a physician. This
objection was overruled. Defendant also offered an affidavit
from the deponent's medical adviser. Now the plaintiff objected
on the ground of hearsay. The ruling as reported by the judge
is curious: "The affidavit . . .to be on my notes, in case
the Court think it admissible on such a point." 44 The deposition
was admitted and defendant had the verdict. A rule nisi on the
ground that the deposition had been improperly admitted was
discharged, four opinions being rendered. We summarize them
in order. Erle, C. J., did not discuss the affidavit, stating that
the other evidence adequately sustained the ruling.41 Willes, J.,
said that he was "far from agreeing" with Taylor's distrust of
Chief Baron Pollock's decision.4  He cited Regina v. Ryle.41 He
41 Robinson v. Markis, 2 Moo. & Rob. 375, 376 (N. P. 1841). The deci-
sion rendered here by Lord Abinger is significant when considered in
connection with Reg. v. Ryle, supra note 14, and infra note 47. The current
of authority is here confused by a line of cases concerning the production
of attesting witnesses. Frequently these cases appear to admit hearsay
evidence when in fact the actual decisions are merely that the offering party
has proved sufficiently diligent search for the desired witnesses. Crosby v.
Percy, 1 Camp. N. P. 303, 304 (N. P. 1808) ; Ward v. Wells, 1 Taunt. 461
(C. P. 1809); Doe d. Johnson v. Johnson, 2 Chit. 196 (K. B. 1818); Kay
v. Brookman, 3 C. & P. 555 (N. P. 1828); Wyatt v. Bateman, 7 C. & P.
586 (N. P. 1836); Willman v. Worrall, 8 C. & P. 380 (N. P. 1838). But
even here objection was raised to hearsay. Doe d. Beard v. Powell, 7 C. &
P. 617 (N. P. 1836). Much the same problem and result are found in the
so-called best evidence cases. Rex v. Castleton, 6 T. R. 236 (K. B. 1795);
Rex v. Morton, 4 Mau. & Sel. 48 (K. B. 1815); Rex v. Denio, 7 B. & C. 620
(K. B. 1827); Rex. v. Rawden, 2 Ad. & El. 156 (K. B. 1834); Reg. v.
Kenilworth, 7 Q. B. 642 (1845) ; and Reg. v. Braintree, 1 El. & El. 51 (Q.
B. 1858). See infra note 84.
42 Knight v. Campbell, 1 TAYLOR, op. cit. supra note 4, § 517, n. (o).
43 Duke of Beaufort v. Crawshay, L. R. 1 C. P. 699 (1866).
44 Ibid. at 700.
45 Ibid. at 705-708.
46 Ibid. at 708.
47 Ibid. at 708-709. Reg. v. Ryle is plainly distinguishable, having been
an ex parte proceeding, not final in its result. 1 WIGORm, op. it. supra note
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then went on to argue that the use of affidavits serves conven-
ience and saves expense. If they are false, the falsity can easily
be exposed. These last remarks by Willes have a ring of com-
mon sense. He is a real rebel. But his colleagues Byles and
Montague Smith, JJ., smother the rebellion with cushions of po-
lite indifference.41 Both really followed the Chief Justice in say-
ing that the evidence other than the affidavit fully justified the
ruling.49
Under any circumstances so indefinite a case as Dzuke of Bcau-
fort v. Cruwshay would hardly have produced much impression.
In fact, with it our line of authorities practically breaks off.;
Why? We suspect because of the spirit infused into English
legal practice by the new Rules following the Judicature Acts.
Order -XXVII of the Rules of the Supreme Court, 1883, provides
in Rule 18 that except as otherwise directed no deposition shall be
given in evidence without consent "unless the court or judge is
satisfied" that certain specified conditions exist which make the
deponent unavailable in person. The whole wording of this rule
is derived directly from the act of Parliament controlling Dzkc
of Beaufort v. Crawshly. The doubt seems to remain just as
that case left it. But Rule 1 of this same Order contains a gen-
eral provision that "the court or a judge may at any time for
sufficient reason order that any particular fact or facts may be
proved by affidavit, or that the affidavit of any witness may be
read at the hearing or trial, on such conditions as the court or
judge think reasonable . . .; provided that, where it appears
to the court or judge that the other party bozna fide desires the
production of a witness for cross-examination, and that such
witness can be produced, an order shall not be made authorizing
the evidence of such witness to be given by affidavit." ' The in-
ference from this to the probable present day English practice in
preliminary disputes of fact seems obvious. These later devel-
opments and possibilities, however, have no immediate bearing
upon the American situation. We are concerned with the general
run of English cases before the Judicature Acts. These cases,
except perhaps some relating to certain useless, objectionable,
and now discarded rules of exclusion, lend little support to the
decided statement by Wigmore which opens this article. Phip-
1, § 4 (3) ; 1 TAYLOR, op. cit. supra note 4, § 517, n. (p). But Willes eitQ3
the case with careful and honest discrimination.
48 L. R. 1 C. P. at 712, 714.
44 Ibid.
50 M'Pherson v. Parnell, 40 L. J. (N. S.), Probate, 30 (1871), does not
carry the question forward a single step. Taylor v. Witham, 3 Ch. D. C05
(1876), is more properly touched upon at p. 1123, infra.
5" For the application of this rule see Blackburn Union v. Brook , 7 Ch.
D. 68 (1877), and Elias v. Griffith, 46 L. J. (N. S.), Ch. 800 (1877).
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son's comparative caution more accurately reflects the old law
of England.
III
The American cases all fall after the date when stagnation be-
gan to still the current of English decision. Consequently, we
had best abandon our historical approach in favor of an attempt
to categorize the contemporary confusion.5 2
The first problem is how far American precedents support
Wigmore's premise. To be sure, multiple arguments might be
made in defense of his position. We have already mentioned its
merit of expediting collateral inquiries which interrupt the
course of a trial. Again, wrangles and reversals on ordinary
evidential points are so distasteful that one welcomes a theory
which avoids quibbling still further removed from the substance
of the controversy. Yet in the last analysis, the chief argument
-and the one upon which Wigmore relies-is that the common
law has matured its system of technical rules solely for the pro-
tection of jurors.5 3 These babes in the judicial woods, beset by
unfamiliar problems amid the courtroom's strange surroundings,
need a fussy guardian with a long list of "Don'ts." Not even
laymen, we are reminded by Sir Henry Maine, brook such con-
trol when handling matters within their own realm of experi-
ence: "A policeman guiding himself by the strict rules of Evi-
dence would be chargeable with incapacity; and a general would
be guilty of a military crime." 53a How much less, runs the con-
tention, are these restrictions required by a judge, who is ac-
customed to the atmosphere of litigation and far exceeds a lay-
man in the asserted poise and acuity of his mind.54
52 The splattering American plan of digesting cases on evidence blocks
any effort to cover the field intensively without using such page-by-page
methods as we employed on the early eighteenth century English reports.
The number of American reports makes these methods impracticable. We
present, however, what we think is a fair sampling of the American deci-
sions.
53 The learned author says that ". . jury-trial rules are intended
for a constantly changing tribunal of fact composed of inexperienced jury-
men dealing with hundreds of types of cases". I WIGMORE, op. cit. Supra
note 1, 30. Wigmore also quotes THAYER, op. cit. supra note 6, 509: " .
our law of evidence is a piece of illogical, but by no means irrational, patch-
work; not at all to be admired, nor easily to be found intelligible, except
as a product of the jury system . . where ordinary, untrained citizens
are acting as judges of fact."
53a Quoted by 1 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 26.
5 This is very forcibly put by a letter published in (1922) 36 HARv. L.
REv. 193 (written by a judge now sitting on the Massachusetts bench),
"It is an actual fact that four-fifths of the contentious litigation in Massa-
chusetts-numerically-is tried to the court, not to a jury. So far as the
true law of Evidence goes-the tail is wagging the dog, and the judiciary
is reveling in this reductio ad absurdum-'we, the judges (of superior men-
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Leaving it for heretics to question the vast superiority of ajudge over twelve jurymen as an arbiter of fact, we shall ask
only how the judges have responded to this flattering line of
argument. If they accept it, one would rather expect the judge
to be relieved of evidential blinders when an action is tried be-
fore him on the merits without a jury.2 A thorough-going ex-
amination of this situation is all the more important because it
has been far better worked out by American courts than has the
situation in which we are primarily interested, and so sheds
light on many of our subsidiary problems.
In extradition and habeas corpus proceedings and the like,
there is a noticeable disposition to dispense with the rules of evi-
dence 5  But the decisions do not purport to be laying down a
rule for anything except interlocutory or ex, parte hearings.
Equally distinguishable from our test case are the very liberal
holdings on appeals from a judge sitting in equity7 This equi-
table laxity has its roots in the practice of an older day, when
an appeal in chancery carried up the whole record, which tradi-
tionally contained only written evidence, for re-determination
tality) are able to discern and segregate those matters by which you, thejurors, might be led astray or biased. But when we come to take your
place and try the facts, we will put the same legal blinders on our own
eyes, lest we be led astray or biased, though we are all the time able to
discern, and so to avoid, that which is liable to lead astray or bias'.
"Wanted-a Moses to lead the lost legal tribes!"
5 See (1915) 1 IowA L. BULL. 144, an interesting discussion, but nt
adequately supported by the cases cited.
51 In Robertson v. Heath, 132 Ga. 310, 64 S. E. 73 (1909), Lumpl:in, J.,
very carefully reviews the authorities as to affidavit proof on habeas c ar-
pus proceedings. Collins . Loisel, 259 U. S. 309, 317 (1922); and E
Parte Germain, 155 N. E. 12 (Mass. 1927), illustrate the liberality in
extradition hearings and the reason therefor. Goodwin v. Blanchard, 73 N.
H. 550, 64 Atl. 22 (1906), collects decisions permitting the ue of affidavits
on motions made before or after trial. But Kipp v. Clinger, 97 Minn. ! Z,
140, 106 N. W. 108, 110 (1906), points the obvious moral that cazes up-
holding the substitution of affidavit evidence for testimony, do not give
carte blanche for more serious violations of the hearsay rule. A very
strict doctrine as to ex parte matters is enunicated by In re McCraven, 87 N.
J. Eq. 28, 99 Atl. 619 (1916).
The exhaustive discussion to be found in 1 WxGoRn, op. cit. supra note
1, § 4c, of how far rules of evidence obtained in administrative proceeding:,
and the more specialized'article by Frank A. Ross in (1923) 36 HIuw. L.
REV. 263, make futile any further citation of cases on that subject.
57Boulder & White Rock Ditch Co. v. Leggett Ditch & Reservoir Co.,
36 Colo. 455, 458, 86 Pac. 101, 102 (1906); Hicks v. Stevens, 121 Ill. 1U3,
198, 11 N. E. 241, 245 (1887); Sawyer v. Campbell, 130 Ill. 186, 201, 22
N. E. 458, 464 (1889) ; Colomb v. First Nat. Bank, 208 N. W. 404 (S. D.
1926); Salt Lake F. & M. Co. v. Mammoth Mining Co., 6 Utah, 351, 2
Pac. 760 (1890). In many of these cases the courts quite unnecessarily rely
on a presumption that the trial judge considered only competent evidence.
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of the facts by the appellate tribunal. 8  Manifestly, an error in
the admission of evidence could not of itself be ground for re-
versal, if there was enough competent testimony to convince the
upper court upon its trial de novo. And this limitation is al-
ways stressed in the equity cases.59
In any sort of proceeding before a judge, some of the form-
alities of a jury trial are bound to get short shrift. The judge
sitting in lieu of a jury can obviously suit his convenience as to
the order of presentation of evidence, and as to whether docu-
ments should be read to him or left for his perusal.," Other ap-
parent deviations from evidential practice are nothing more than
sudden transitions from the role of juryman to that of judge.
For example, after hearing evidence qua trior, His Honor will
not be violating any rules if he asks, qua judge, for a written
summary of the testimony as part of a legal argument-even
though his quick change into the robe leaves us rubbing our eyes
,a bitr 1
582 DANIELL, CHANCERY PLEADING AND PRACTICE (6th Anier. ed. 1894),
*1484, states: "Where the appeal is against the whole decree, the cause
is, in ordinary cases, actually reheard: that is, the case is stated, and the
cause proceeded with, exactly as if it were an original hearing."
For decisions pointing to this as the true explanation, see Clapp v, Ful-
lerton, 34 N. Y. 190, 195 (1866), and cases cited supra note 57. Degginger
v. Martin, 48 Wash. 1, 92 Pac. 674 (1907), urges the inclusion of doubt-
ful evidence in the appeal record to facilitate the trial de novo, though it is
not careful to confine itself to chancery cases. Cf. the dictum in Nichols
& Shepard v. Stangler, 7 N. D. 102, 104, 72 N. W. 1089 (1897), which
turns upon the peculiar statute involved.
59 See Small v. Harrington, 10 Idaho, 499, 510, 79 Pac. 461, 464 (1904);
King v. Pony Gold Mining Co., 28 Mont. 74, 94, 72 Pac. 309, 316 (1903).
Barrie v. United Rys., 125 Mo. App. 96, 102 S. W. 1078 (1907), reversed
a decree based solely upon incompetent evidence; and Farmer's Bank v.
Gould, 42 W. Va. 132, 24 S. E. 547 (1896), reversed for the exclusion of
competent evidence. Cf. Spanagel v. Dellinger, 38 Cal. 278 (1869), which
changes the emphasis to whether the judge below acted upon the bad evi-
dence. Kaczmarczyk v. Dolato, 191 Ind. 540, 133 N. E. 829 (1922), refuses
to follow the old equity rule because the code has assimilated equitable and
legal appellate procedure. See also Murdick v. United States, 15 F. (2d)
965 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926), which applies something like the equity rule where
hearsay had come before a grand jury.
The equity rule here discussed differs from the old King's Bench rule for
jury trials, and from the New York rule in workmen's compensation cases.
In calling for reversal when there is not enough competent evidence to con-
vince the upper court, it is midway between the King's Bench rule, which
calls for reversal whenever the lower court's decision was probably af-
fected, and the compensation cases, which reverse when there is no com-
petent evidence on the issue.
60 Hall v. U. S., 267 Fed. 795 (C. C. A. 5th, 1920) (form of questions).
See Webb v. Archibald, 28 S. W. 80, 81 (Mo. 1895) (whether document
must be read); Pease v., State, 155 S. W. 657, 661 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913)
(leading questions).
C2 See Coniglio v. Conn. Fire Ins. Co., 180 Calif. 596, 600, 182 Pac. 275,
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Greenleaf could not be persuaded that such lightning trans-
formations were possible. The learned author felt that no rules
of evidence could bind the judicial trior of fact, because in his
capacity as judge of the law he had to pass upon the proffered
evidence whether good or bad., "2 Now, there is much sound
psychology in this view. Nature does not furnish a jurist's
brain with thought-tight compartments to suit the convenience of
legal theory, and convincing evidence once heard does leave its
mark. To a certain extent, however, this can be obviated by
substituting summarized offers of proof for the evidence itself,
when a question of admissibility impends. At all events, the
usual attitude is to be profoundly confident that an occupant of
the bench can erase from his mind even the strongest evidence,
once he decides it inadmissible by ever so small a margin. 3
Two kinds of cases show Greenleaf's influence. The first talks
bravely in some such fashion as: "Upon a trial before a court,
the same strictness in regard to the admission of evidence is not
required as upon a trial before a jury"; but invariably ends up
by declaring that the error was harmless anyhow.ca These dicta
indicate an attitude of mind, not a rule of law.-. The second and
stronger line of authority advances the pcsmaption that the
court, in weighing the evidence, was governed by correct rules
of law. 1  It is presumed that after all the evidence was in, the
276, 277 (1919). The converse case is presented by Willcox v. Forbes, 173
lass. 63, 53 N. E. 146 (1899), where the judge's role merges into that of
the juryman. But cf. Jones v. Gammans, 11 Nev. 249 (17).
62 1 GREENLAFm, E IENCE (16th ed. 1899) § 81e, which in earlier editions
is § 49: "In trials of fact, without the aid of a jury, the question of the
admissibility of evidence, strictly spealdng, can seldom be raised; since,
whatever be the ground of the objection, the evidence objected to nurt,
of necessity, be read or heard by the judge, in order to dctermine its
character and value. In such cases, the only question, in Effcct, is up .n
the sufficiency and weight of the evidence."
So also, THAYm,, op. cit. su'pra note 6, at 529, talldng of incompetent cvi-
dence in depositions: "In most instances there is small profit in fighting
over the admissibility of evidence which is already in, and has once been read
by or to the tribunal; under such circumstances the whole doctrine of the
exclusion of evidence is in great degree inoperative."
But see (1915) 1 IowA L. BULL. 144, which stresses the practice of
charging juries to disregard incompetent evidence.
63 But Spanagel v. Dellinger, su~pra note 59, reversed a trial judge cvn
though he declared he had erased the effect of certain incompetent evidence
from his mind before his decision.
64 Shelley v. Westcott, 23 App. D. C. 135, 140 (1904); Povwers & Boyd
Cornice & Roofing Co. v. Muir, 146 Mo. App. 30, 56, 123 S. W. 490, 496
(1909) ; Andrews v. Key, 77 Tex. 35, 38, 13 S. W. 640, 641 (1890) ; Waldie
v. Brooklyn El. R. R., 89 Hun, 608, 35 N. Y. Supp. 40 (N. Y. Sup. Ct.
1895); Smalley v. Mores, 65 Iowa, 386, 389, 21 N. W. 090, 692 (1834).
c5 Holmes v. State, 108 Ala. 24, 26, 18 So. 529, 50 (1895); Andrevs
v. Hayden's Adm'r., 88 Ky. 455, 460-1, 11 S. W. 428 (1889). See Mofiitt
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grain was winnowed from the chaff, and only the proper evi-
dence considered. As we have seen, the mere fact that the judge
listened to incompetent evidence is no ground for reversing
him, since he has to determine admissibility. Even if he did
not forthwith rule that the evidence was bad, it might well be
that he was merely deferring his determination of the prelim-
inary question. But circumstances may clearly negative this
charitable interpretation. If after an evidential objection and
argument thereupon, he definitely admits the improper evidence,
it requires an appellate Pollyanna with fingers crossed and tongue
in cheek, to presume that the trial judge discovered and
remedied his error before judgment. Some courts abandon the
"presumption" at this point.60 Others, undaunted in their op-
timism, adopt the position most often asserted by the Nebraska
cases that the mere admission of immaterial and incompetent
evidence can never of itself be reversible error.21
But if the proponent of the judge's freedom from the rules of
evidence seeks to rely upon these lines of decision, he will find
them mere ropes of sand. Nothing is clearer than that a trial
judge in any jurisdiction will be reversed for lack of enough
material and competent evidence to support his finding, no mat-
ter how much inadmissible evidence there was in his favor."'
v. Hereford, 132 Mo. 513, 522, 34 S. W. 252, 254 (1895); Lewis v. Frankle,
158 Mo. App. 262, 265, 138 S. W. 64, 65 (1911).
This crystallizes into a form of statement that the judgment will not
be reversed if there is sufficient evidence to sustain it. Sutton v. Hasey,
58 Wis. 556, 562, 17 N. W. 416, 418 (1883); Barnes v. Cole, 138 Wash.
481, 483, 244 Pac. 728 (1926) ; Knippa v. Umlang, 27 S. W. 915, 917 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1894). Nutter v. Sydenstricker, 11 W. Va. 535, 543 (1877),
adopts this position for curiously confused reasons, and is followed in the
criminal case of State v. Denoon, 34 W. Va. 139, 11 S. E. 1003 (1890),
which treats the appellant convicted of a misdemeanor before a single
judge as a demurrant to the competent evidence.
66Weibert v. Hanan, 202 N. Y. 328, 95 N. E. 688 (1911), reversing 136
App. Div. 388, 121 N. Y. Supp. 35 (1910), and followed in Harding v. Con-
Ion, 159 App. Div. 441, 144 N. Y. Supp. 663 (1913) ; Jones v. Snow, 64 Calif.
456, 2 Pac. 28 (1884), (evidence excluded); Baker v. Baker, 43 Ind. App.
26, 31, 86 N. E. 864, 866 (1909).
67 Enyeart v. Davis, 17 Neb. 228, 22 N. W. 449 (1885), is the hesitant
progenitor of the Nebraska line. Willard v. Foster, 24 Neb. 205, 213,
38 N. W. 786, 790 (1888), seeks to explain the doctrine as merely per-
mitting the judge to defer examination of the evidence. But Monroe v.
Reid, 46 Neb. 316, 328, 64 N. W. 983, 987 (1895), shows that the court is
ready to go far beyond this. Dogmatic statements of the Nebraska rule
appear in National Masonic Accident Ass'n. v. Burr, 57 Neb. 437, 441,
77 N. W. 1098, 1100 (1899).; Smith Premier Typewriter Co. v. Mayhew, 65
Neb. 65, 90 N. W. 939 (1902). The Nebraska language may have
influenced Eureka Steam Heating Co. v. Sloteman, 69 Wis. 398, 34 N. W.
387 (1887).
68 Simmons v. Poole, 227 Mass. 29, 116 N. E. 227 (1917); Wadleigh v.
Parker, 34 Okla. 213, 218, 124 Pac. 957, 959 (1912). This is made clear
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That is to say, if the judge stands convicted beyond a reasonable
doubt of having decided on the basis of improper evidence,
neither Greenleaf nor Wigmore nor Willes has power to absolve
him. Thus the presumption-indulging courts swing into line with
the bulk of authority 19 in holding the trial judge bound, albeit
somewhat less finically, by the rules of evidence.-- That they
seem to compromise with the opposite view is due, one suspects,
to an excessive indulgence toward the venial errors of their
brothers of the robe, and to an unreasoning imitation of the re-
sult reached for historical reasons in that type-case of the judi-
cial t1ior, the judge in equity.
IV
In People v. Plyler,7 the prosecution offered a transcript of
the testimony given at a prior trial by one Bradley. The Cali-
fornia code provided that such evidence was admissible "upon
its being satisfactorily shown to the court" that the former
declarant was dead. To meet this requirement, there was intro-
duced an affidavit by Bradley's sister that he had died since the
previous proceeding. The trial court admitted the transcript.
On appeal this was held reversible error, the California court
saying: "Any evidence introduced to show the death of the
witness was as much a part of the trial as any other part of it.
And the fact that the witness was dead could no more be
shown by affidavit than the fact that [sic] dying declarations
could be shown by affidavit to have been made under a sense of
impending death, or that [sic] the contents of a written docu-
ment could be shown, supplemented by an affidavit to the effect
that the document was lost."
inferentially by the cases in notes 65 and G7 'wpra. Even Nebrasha ac-
cords. See Merchant's Nat. Bank v. McDonald, 63 Neb. 363, 370, 83 N. W.
492, 496 (1901). Cases reversing where there was other competcnt evidence
but proof that the judge acted upon the incompEtent, are Viele v. Me-
Lean, 200 N. Y. 260, 93 N. E. 468 (1910); Jaclon v. Thornton, 8 01la.
331, 344, 58 Pac. 951, 955 (1899). Hirshman v. H. D. Best & Co., 125 N.
Y. Supp. 476 (Sup. Ct., App. T. 1910), and Clapp v. Engledow, 72 Tex. 252,
10 S. W. 462 (1888), show how the last type of decision tends toward
adoption of the stricter King's Bench rule.
c A recent Maryland case applies the orthodox rule to homicide pro-
secutions tried to three judges. The court split widely, but the disscnters
contended for nothing more than indulgence of a strong presumption. The
opinions are worth reading. Dobbs v. State, 148 Md. 34, 49, 04, 67, 129
Atl. 275, 281, 287, 288 (1925), criticized in (1925) 11 Corn. L. Q. 89. An
earlier case betokens a slightly more liberal spirit Cothron v. State, 138
Md. 101, 110, 115, 113 Atl. 620, 624, 626 (1921).
70 To be sure, this might be due to a policy of assimilating trials with
a jury waived to jury trials, a consideration -which does not exist in the
case of a judge hearing evidence upon the voir dire.
7' 126 Calif. 379, 58 Pac. 904 (1899).
72Ibid. at 381, 58 Pac. at 905.
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This brings us to the heart of our problem. Square, deliberate
holdings on these matters occur in the American reports less
frequently than might be supposed. Before seeing how far
California is representative of her sister states in throwing the
gauntlet down before Wigmore, 73 we will do well to note the rea-
sons for this comparative scarcity of decision. For one thing,
there are happily a few upper courts which refuse under any
circumstances, and many which refuse under some circum-
stances, to re-examine trial judges' determinations of prelimin-
ary questions of fact.74 Logically this does not prevent an up-
per court from reversing for an erroneous admission of evidence
upon which the determination was based.75 Yet to do so cer-
tainly violates the spirit of the rule of finality. It does not
follow that judges are invited to ignore the rules of evidence;
but merely that the time of supreme courts will not be wasted by
appeals concerning specific infractions. Even in jurisdictions
not adhering to the rule of finality, lawyers may feel that though
the admission of incompetent collateral evidence is reviewable
error, there is little likelihood of its being reversible error. A
practice of keeping impromptu disputes over the admission of
evidence off the stenographic record may also thwart the would-
be appellant.
In the few states permitting or requiring the judge to shift
all disputed preliminary questions of fact to the jury,7M our ques-
tion has small chance of arising. In many other states the
rule prevails that any question of fact as to evidence presented
by the prosecution in a criminal case must, if the judge decides
7 Curiously enough, an early California case goes further than almost
any American authority in supporting Wigmore's thesis. Bagley v. Eaton,
10 Calif. 126 (1858). But the rule of the Plyler case is regarded as set-
tled law in California by People v. Frank, 193 Calif. 474, 225 Pac. 448
(1924), which reversed a conviction because depositions of the prosecuting
witnesses were admitted upon a showing of unavailability by letters not
technically authenticated.
7 Dunklee v. Prior, 80 N. H. 270, 116 Atl. 138 (1922), points with pride
to 1 WiGmo.E, op. cit. supra note 1, § 16, which points with pride to prior
New Hampshire decisions advocating this position. Chief Justice Shaw
of Massachusetts enunciated the rule of finality as far back as Dole v.
Thurlow, 12 Metc. 157, 159 (Mass. 1846). Of course, most states do con-
siderable revising of the trial judge's determination under the guise of
seeing whether discretion has been abused. In some states the judge's
ruling seems to be final unless he chooses to report the evidence for ap-
pellate consideration. Sarle v. Arnold, 7 R. I. 582, 586 (1863).
75 Cf. People v. Kunz, 73 Calif. 313, 14 Pac. 836 (1887). And see State
v. Monich, 74 N. J. L. 522, 526, 64 Atl. 1016, 1017 (1906), where Justice
Pitney declares a preliminary ruling not reviewable "if there be any legal
evidence".
76 Robin v. Bartlett, 64 N. H. 426, 13 Atl. 645 (1887) ; Hartford Fire Ins.
Co. v. Reynolds, 36 Mich. 502 (1877). See King v. Hanson, 13 N. D. 85,
100, 99 N. W. 1085, 1090 (1904) ; 1 GREENLEAF, op. cit. supra note 62, § 81e.
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in favor of admissibility, be resubmitted to the jury."7  It re-
quires such hardihood for a lawyer in these states to contend
that different rules of evidence should apply to the successive
triors of the same dispute, that Wigmore's argument is seldom
heard in criminal appeals.
The Plyler decision brings up our problem with startling em-
phasis. That the case arises under a code provision does not
detract from its authority, since the vagueness of the legislative
language compelled the interpreters to fall back upon what they
conceived to be the common law. The infraction of evidential
rules could scarcely be less objectionable: the admission of testi-
mony which the accused had had prior opportunity to cross-
examine, upon the basis of sworn declarations by the witness's
own sister that he had died. Where would a judge need less
protection than in the use of affidavits to lay a predicate for the
admission of evidence, and where would departure from the
orthodox rules be more expedient?16 Yet the California court
considers this a trangression serious enough to call for a new
trial, and indicates that it would be similarly severe as to other
types of preliminary inquiry.
Even the court's statement that the preliminary evidence was
"a part of the trial" is by no means a truism. In Obon v. State,-
the prosecution sought to prove an issue upon a voir dire ex-
amination by introducing an official certificate. Without decid-
ing whether use of certificate evidence would ordinarily violate
the prisoner's constitutional right of confrontation, the Wiscon-
sin court held that giving evidence upon the voir dire is not testi-
fying against the prisoner. Of these clashing views, the better
seems to be California's.60 Probably nobody would disagree with
.7Lesieurs v. State, 170 Ark. 560, 280 S. W. 9 (192G); Muzzer v. State,
157 Ind. 423, 443, 61 N. E. 1, 8 (1901), annotated (1901) 15 HAFLV. L. REY.
320. Authorities on the practice in regard to dying declarations and con-
fessions are collected in THAYER, CASES ON EYMENCE (Gaguire's ed. 1925)
106, n. 1. See also (1925) 25 COL. L. REv. 673 and (1925) 24 'hICH. L. Ruv.
196.
-s But there is much sound sense in the depreciation of affidavit evidence
by Lumpkin, J. in Robertson v. Heath, sutpra note 56, at 312, 64 S. E. at 71:
"To see and listen to a witness for ten minutes, with the privilege on the
part of the court to interpose a question when it is necessary for the full
development of the truth, often gives the presiding judge a clearer insight
into the real situation . . . than to listen to affidavits for an hour
Affidavits on the same side are sometimes as uniform in appearance
as eggs in a shell; but if one of them be prodded with the point of a crozz-
question or two, the yolk is at once exposed."
7- 143 Wis. 249, 266, 126 N. W. 737, 744 (1910). This case is undoubtedly
sound in result in admitting authenticated copies of public records to b2
used against a criminal defendant.
8, Moore v. State, 45 Tex. Cr. 234, 75 S. W. 497 (1903), and 0zborne v.
Com., 282 S. W. 762 (Ky. App. 1926), offer collateral support for this view.
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the suggestion made at the outset of this article that rules of
evidence which are based upon considerations of policy, rather
than a desire to insure the truth, necessarily apply to the judge
as much as to the jury. Such rules, especially when formulated
in constitutions or ini statutes, should be safe from evasion via
the narrowed construction adopted in the Oborn case.
People v. Plyler is not alone in refusing to permit proof by
affidavits in controversies over the admissibility of evidence. The
same stand was taken by the Massachusetts judges in 1829,1
and by a good many others down to 1926.82 Courts so holding
do not overlook the well established common law rule that a
party's affidavit was competent to prove the loss of a document
and other preliminary matters.8 3  Neither are they deterred
thereby, for this rule was always regarded as a distinct exception
to the usual course of things. Its origin must be ascribed not
to confidence in the judge's superior acuity, but to the necessity
for escaping an unendurably onerous result of the disqualification
for interest.
At first blush it seems strange that decisions more frequently
sanction the introduction of oral hearsay declarations than of
affidavits. The fact that the cases admitting hearsay are all
of one type suggests the clue.84 Interstate Investment Co. v.
Bailey 85 may be taken as representative. To account for the
non-production of a deed, the defendant traced it into the hands
of one S, and then offered evidence of unswqrn declarations tend-
ing to prove that S had left the jurisdiction and lost the docu-
ment. In holding the evidence admissible, the upper court was
not prepared to say that loss could be proved by hearsay. It pre-
ferred to rest upon the argument that the offeror of secondary
evidence need merely show the unsuccessful termination of a
reasonably diligent search for the original. Since he will often
81 Poignand v. Smith, 8 Pick. 272 (Mass. 1829).
82 Valuenzuela v. State, 248 Pac. 36 (Ariz. 1926); Becker v. Quigg, 54
Ill. 390 (1870); Viles v. Moulton, 13 Vt. 510 (1841). The argument of
State v. Allen, 253 Pac. 371, 373 (Ore. .1927), points to the same result.
Today the situation is often complicated by statutes requiring preliminary
proof "under oath", as in Steagald v. State, 22 Tex. App. 464, 3 S. W. 771
(1886).
83 Tayloe v. Riggs, 1 Pet. 591, 596 (U. S. 1828) ; Bachelder v. Nutting,
16 N. H. 261 (1844); Beall v. Francis, 137 S. E. 251 (Ga. 1927). See the
alternative explanation by Field, J. in Bagley v. Eaton, supra note 73.
Modern statutes have often perpetuated this anomaly after its reason dis-
appeared. See Ill. Rev. Stat. (Smith, 1921) c. 30, § 36; Wyo. Comp. Stat.
(1920) § 4587.
84 Pili6 v. Kenner, 2 Rob. 95 (La. 1842); Harper v. Scott, 12 Ga. 125,
135 (1852); Bridges v. Hyatt, 2 Abb. Prac. 449 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1856);
People v. Fay, 255 Pac. 239, 242 (Calif. App. 1927). English cases are cited
supra note 41.
85 93 S. W. 578 (Ky. App. 1906).
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be justified in ending his search if inquiries directed to well-
informed people prove fruitless, the declarations of such people
become circumstantially relevant, and the hearsay rule is not
violated. But not every case which has permitted the use of
hearsay can be distinguished upon this ground. Here and there
one finds appellate approval of the introduction of a declaration
which had obviously been used for its assertive value.83 The fact
that this will almost inevitably be the case where affidavits are
admitted, explains their higher mortality rate.87 Lest the gen-
eral rule be obscured in our discussion of the exceptions, it is
well to repeat that the majority of cases flatly forbid the judge
to receive affidavits or evidence of unsworn declarations when
making his preliminary decisions.8 s
There have been decidedly few attempts to dispense with truth-
insuring rules other than the hearsay rule. An apparent one is
the long standing practice of allowing oral proof of the con-
tents of a writing upon the voir di'e.80 But this can be as well
accounted for by that vaguely defined exception to the best evi-
dence rule covering documents "collateral to the action," as by
any distinction between judicial and lay triors.P On the other
86 Higgins v. Watson, 1 Manning 428, 431-2 (Mich. 1853). Bridges v.
Hyatt, su'pra note 34, though purporting to go on this ground, can be ex-
plained as in the text.
sT See Meldrum v. State, 23 Wyo. 12, 36, 146 Pac. 596, 600 (1915), in
favor of admission. Bagley v. Eaton, supra note 73, and Taylor v. Mc-
Irvin, 94 Ill. 488 (1880), are inconsistent with later decisions in their
respective jurisdictions. Pilid v. Kenner, supra note 84, perhaps comes
under the traditional exception discussed supra note 83, since the affidavit
was by a party's attorney.
It is interesting to note that these cases are characterized as 112o,-i'.d in
3 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 1, § 1709, n. 7; just as the use of party's
affidavits is referred to as an exception to the hearsay rule in 2 ibid. 757
(but cf. ibid. 756, n. 6).
88 Hearsay: Chapin v. Taft, 18 Pick. 379 (Mass. 1836); Kenworthy V.
Slooman, 62 Ore. 604, 125 Pac. 273 (1912); Ogburn v. State, 96 Te%. Cr.
339, 257 S. W. 887 (1924). See Fry v. Bennett, 4 Duer 247, 251-4 (N. Y.
Sup. Ct. 1855). As to affidavits, see cases szpra notes 71, 81, and 82.
Commonwealth v. Waite, 5 Mass. 261 (1809), is typical of the case3
which refuse to allow a witness's extra-judicial assertions of his interest
to be used in disqualifying him. Compare its English prototype, m.,pra
note 28; and distinguish such cases as State v. Wilson, 111 So. 481 (La.
1927), where the state of an impeached witness's mind is material.
89 Lett v. State, 124 Ala. 64, 27 So. 256 (1900); Babcock v. Smith, 31 Ill.
57 (1863); Oaks v. Weller, 16 Vt. 63, 68 (1844). See Miller v. Mariner's
Church, 7 Greenl. 51, 54 (Me. 1830).
'10 See cases collected in 2 WxG,%o=u, op. cit. svpra note 1, § 1254. The
language of many is broad enough to cover this situation, though they do not
deal with preliminary inquiries. Wigmore's own explanation of the devia-
tion from the best evidence rule has no reference to the peculiar immunity
of a judge. Ibid. § 1258: "Since the person to be called as witness might
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hand, there is much to confirm one's suspicions of a lessened
respect for rules of evidence which are essentially procedural.
This has been invoked to justify refusal of cross-examination,"
but it is clear that at least in criminal cases the majority of
courts will not go so far.92  Of rules based upon policy we have
spoken above.
V
All the cases thus far considered involved evidence concededly
not admissible on the merits. They do not tell us how far the
judge can go in extracting information from the writing or
declaration or witness whose competency is being determined.
Of course he is free to glean what he can from appearance,
demeanor, phraseology, and the like.93 But will he be permitted
to ask the witness questions, or to give credence to the oral or
written statement, before he has determined whether or not it
may be introduced before the jury?
Under the Wigmore-Willes view, the reply is an obvious yes.
We have, however, sufficiently indicated our skepticism as to
the judge's exemption from most rules of evidence. Then are
we forced to answer the present question in the negative, for fear
of involving the judge in a vicious circle? Many a circle which
comes in roaring with leonine viciousness submits to straighten-
ing as meekly as any lamb. So it seems to be here.
When a witness on the voir dire is asked whether he has an
interest in the suit, or if he is married to the defendant who
has objected to his testifying against her, the problem is pre-
sented in its easier phase, upon which we have already touched
in our discussion of the English authorities.9 4 It is, we said,
perfectly legitimate to give effect to rules of incompetency
only when the evidence is known, not barely asserted, to be
not be known in advance to the opponent, it would be practically impossible
for him to have the document at hand."
91 Sarle v. Arnold, supra note 74; Com. v. Morrell, 99 Mass. 542 (1868),
followed in the more conservative decision of Com. v. Hall, 164 Mass. 152,
14 N. E. 133 (1895).
92 See cases collected in UNDERHILL, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1923)
313, n. 49; 2 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 1, 219, n. 4, 5.
93 This is carried furthest when the contents of letters are used circum-
stantially to authenticate them, as in 'People V. Dunbar Contracting Co.,
215 N. Y. 416, 423, 109 N. E. 554, 555 (1915) ; People v. Adams, 162 Mich.
371, 384, 127 N. W. 354, 360 (1910).
94 Interest: James V. Fairall, 168 Iowa, 427, 434, 148 N. W. 1029, 1032
(1914); and see Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 36 Mich. 502, 504
(1877). Marital incompetency or privilege: State V. Lee, 127 La. 1077, 54
So. 356 (1911); Territory v. Cheong Kwai, 15 Hawaiian, 280 (1903).
See text, page 1106 supra.
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incompetent- This position is buwarked by the usual presump-
tion in favor of the admissibility of evidence not obviously in-
competent.
A harder fight comes when the burden of going forward with
preliminary evidence of competency is upon the offeror. Thus,
in Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Fostcr,0 a corporate defendant sum-
moned one of its officers to the stand. Upon the plaintiff's
objection that an officer was presumably a stockholder, and so
disqualified for interest, the witness offered to swear that he
had assigned all his stock. But the trial court would have
none of this rebuttal, and the upper court agreed that "it was
clearly right to reject his oath as a means of dihcsting himself
of his interest". The same situation arises when the prosecu-
tion offers a woman who has concededly gone through the form
of marriage with the defendant, and seeks to have her qualify
herself by testifying to facts which show the invalidity of the
marriage.97 While a ruling against admissibility is by no means
unreasonable here, it is not inevitable. Even presumptively
incompetent evidence falls outside the prohibition if rules are
confined to definitely incompetent evidence.
The question most frequently arises as to unsworn declara-
tions whose prim facie incompetency the offeror is seeking to
remove by forcing them within one of the exceptions to the
hearsay rule." This situation has been much to the fore in
the recent cases. For example, in Armour & Co. v. Industrial
Commission 99 it became necessary to support a workman's com-
pensation award by finding some technically competent evidence
that the fatal injury had been sustained in the course of employ-
ment. The only bit of proof which could possibly qualify was
-1 When the privilege against self-incrimination is claimed-as it nrir-
mally will be-during the preliminary inquiry to determine whether it
can be claimed on the merits, a different rule obtains. Disclosure to the
judge of the allegedly inculpatory matter is not required. Burr's Trial, 1
Robertson, 243, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 14,692 (?kix piis, 1807); State v.
Thaden, 43 Minn. 253, 45 N. W. 447 (1890). Nor do documents as to
which the attorney-client privilege has been claimed have to be produced
on the preliminary determination of whether this privilege exists, it was
said in Bujac v. Wilson, 27 N. Mex. 112, 196 Pac. 513, 514 (1921), and
cases there cited.
9 59 Pa. 365, 366, 371 (1868) ; cf. 1 GREENLEA, EVMENCE (16th ed. 1899)
§§ 422, 423, in App. II at 908-909.
' Shaak's Estate, 4 Brewst. 305 (Pa. 1867); Hoxie v. State, 114 Ga. 19,
39 S. E. 944 (1901); Jeems v. State, 141 Ga. 493, 81 S. E. 202 (1914).
Os Had we not confined our analysis to American cases, this would have
been the place to discuss Taylor v. Witham, aupra note 50, where
Jessel, M. R., was prepared to allow proof of a loan by the introduction,
as statements against interest, of entries in the alleged creditor's ledger
that £10 interest installments had been paid upon the alleged £2000 loan,
in the absence of any other proof that the money was owing.
' 78 Colo. 569, 243 Pac. 546 (1926).
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testimony that the workman, sitting in his accustomed place near
his engine, had said to someone entering the room: "I got a
dirty fall", and then given details of how the machine had just
injured him. That was all, except that immediately there-
after the workman resumed his duties. The award was sus-
tained, on the ground that these declarations followed soon
enough after the injury to be spontaneous. Yet the only way
for the court to know this, or to know that there was any injury
at all, was from the very evidence in dispute.
The Armour opinion cites Insurance Co. v. Mosley, 00 decided
by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1869. A ma-
jority of the Court in that case upheld the admission of declara-
tions by the insured that he had just fallen and hurt himself,
although nobody had seen or heard the fall which the declara-
tions "characterized." However, the declarant's pained expres-
sion at the time he spoke, and to some extent his posture, con-
trasted with his normal appearance a little while before, showed
that something had happened in the interim, so the ruling
appears not damningly unorthodox. Slight circumstantial proof
of a similar nature may explain several other cases in which
spontaneous declarations seem to lift themselves in by their own
bootstraps.1 1 The Armour case is susceptible of no such expla-
nation, as it itself points out. Nor are three other cases in-
volving spontaneous declarations, decided within the past two
years in the same fashion.10 2
Similar situations arising with regard to other hearsay ex-
ceptions find the courts far more chary. Thus, the California
court, thinking its action called for by People v. Plyler, refused
to admit depositions on the basis of statements contained in them
that the declarants were and would continue to be outside the
state.10 3 A similar refusal is traditional where recitals in a
sheriff's deed of the judgment and issue of execution under
which he acted are introduced as official written statements of
these facts.0 4 The sheriff was under an official duty to make
this deed only if in fact there had been a judgment and execution
100 8 Wall. 397 (U. S. 1869).
101 Guyer v. Equitable Gas Co., 279 Pa. 5, 123 Atl. 590 (1924) (declarant
very pale); Haubrock v. Lamping, 20 Ohio App. 307, 152 N. E. 205 (1925)
(declarant in fainting condition); Kenney v. State, 79 S. W. 817 (Tex. Cr.
1903) (child exhibiting evidences of having been attacked).
102 Bunker v. Motor Wheel Corp., 231 Mich. 334, 204 N. W. 110 (1925),
and Young v. Stewart, 191 N. C. 297, 131 S. E. 735 (1926), admits such evi-
dence. Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. Rowland's Adm'r., 215 Ky. 663, 286
S. W. 929 (1926), in reversing for other evidential errors, expressly de-
clares such evidence admissible on the new trial.
o3 People v. Frank, supra note 73. Cf. Pollard's Heirs v. Lively, 2 Grat.
216 (Va. 1845), which seems to reach an opposite result.
104 See Hihn v. Peck, 30 Calif. 280, 288 (1866); Lessee of Wilson v. Mc-
Veagh, 2 Yeates, 86 (Pa. Nisi Prius, 1796).
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issued thereupon. So too with the date on an allegedly ancient
document as proof of its age." 5 In State v. Walker,'" the Iowa
court decisively denied that declarations of an alleged co-con-
spirator might be allowed in evidence against the defendant on
the basis of their own assertion of the conspiracy. This is in
harmony with the legion of cases refusing to permit declarations
of an alleged agent to be used as vicarious admission until the
agency is otherwise established, no matter how forcefully they
themselves proclaim the existence of the agency relation.' 7
VI
Only a few brief concluding statements seem necessary. If
progress in the matters here discussed is to be measured by the
liberality with which printed cases disregard the truth-assuring
[or merely procedural] rules of evidence, one can hardly say that
our American law is more progressive than the English law.
But when seeking a standard of measurement we must not for-
get or undervalue certain facts already suggested. Points of
evidence in this field of preliminary controversy arise abruptly
and are handled summarily. Thus counsel and court often dis-
pose of such points without clearly realizing the problem pre-
sented. Here the judge's innate liberalism and common sense
may well lead to rulings unconsciously agreeing with the policy
which Wigmore obviously approves. Even where the problem
is clearly perceived, counsel may perforce or by custom accept
the trial judge's ruling as final. Here is an excellent opening
for conscious liberalism, with the trial judge's hand strength-
ened by the likelihood that if his ruling be asserted and recognized
as an error on appeal, the upper court will declare the error
immaterial. On the whole, then, it is perhaps wisest to think of
the few reported cases as often being persuasive only, and to
admit frankly that in this minor aspect we are unlikely to find a
common law of evidence. Instead we must depend upon local or
even individual judicial inclination. This is not clearly undesir-
able. It scarcely cuts deep enough to change our government
of laws into a government of men. Rather it gives reasonable
play to an inescapable humanizing factor of judicial adminis-
tration.
15 E. g., Bower v. Cohen, 126 Ga. 35, 54 S. E. 918 (1906).
1o6 124 Iowa, 414, 100 N. W. 354 (1904).
107 Cases are collected in 1 DIECHErn, AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) § 233, and 2
WIGMOmr, op. cit. supra note 1, § 1078, n. 5. Of course the declaration3
would not be admissible on any theory unless they convinced the judge
both that the agency relation existed and that the agent's duties r,-
quired him to disclose his role. If there is sufficient other evidence of the
agency to raise only a prbina facle case, there is some authority that the
declarations are admissible on the merits, but this involves a different
principle than the one discussed in this article. See (1927) 40 Hnv. L.
Rnv. 392, 418.
